

## Parallel Lives: Hannibal and Scipio in Livy's Third Decade

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**SUMMARY:** I trace the correspondences between the lives of Hannibal and Scipio in the third Decade of *Ab urbe condita* and show how Livy fashions the two as “parallel lives.” I further explore how this synkrisis reflects issues critical to the political discourse of the late Republic and sets up an exemplary antithesis between Rome’s past *virtus* and her present decline.

IN AUC 30.30, HANNIBAL AND SCIPIO, the undisputed protagonists of the Decade and, as Livy reminds us, the greatest leaders of their age, meet on the field of Zama, just before the Carthaginians and Romans engage in what will be their final confrontation (for the time being). The entire episode, undoubtedly one of the climactic points of the narrative, is indebted to Polybius’ account.<sup>1</sup> Within it, however, Hannibal’s speech presents un-Polybian characteristics that need closer scrutiny. After a rather somber and lengthy reflection on the fickleness of fortune (Polybian in tone and theme), Hannibal develops important points of comparison between himself and Scipio that are completely absent from the Polybian version (30.30.12–15<sup>2</sup>):

Quod ego fui ad Trasumennum, ad Cannas, id tu hodie es. Vixdum militari aetate imperio accepto omnia audacissime incipientem nusquam fefellit fortuna. Patris et patruī persecutus mortem ex calamitate vestrae domus decus insigne virtutis pietatisque eximiae cepisti; amissas Hispanias reciperasti quattuor inde Punicis exercitibus pulsus; consul creatus, cum ceteris ad tutandam Italiam parum animi esset, transgressus in Africam duobus hic exercitibus caesis, binis eadem hora captis simul incensisque castris, Syphace

<sup>1</sup> See Plb. 15.6.4–7.9 with Walbank ad loc.

<sup>2</sup> For books 26–30 the text is that of Conway and Johnson; for 21–25 it is that of Walters and Conway. On this passage see Mader 206–9, who views Hannibal’s speech as that of a repented *hybristēs*. Cf. also Butler and Scullard ad loc., Edlund, and Will 168–69.

potentissimo rege capto, tot urbibus regni eius, tot nostri imperii ereptis, me sextum decimum iam annum haerentem in possessione Italiae detraxisti. ... et mihi talis aliquando fortuna adfulsit.

What I was at Trasimene, at Cannae, that you are today. Having received a command when barely old enough for service, you undertook everything with the greatest boldness; nowhere fortune did fail you. By avenging the death of your father and uncle you won from the disaster to your family a splendid reputation for courage and extraordinary devotion. You recovered the lost provinces of Spain, driving out of them four Punic armies. Elected consul, while the rest lacked courage to defend Italy, you crossed over to Africa. Here you destroyed two armies, captured two camps in the same hour and burnt them at the same time, took prisoner Syphax, a most powerful king, seized so many cities of his kingdom, so many in our domain, dragged me away when for sixteen years I had clung to the possession of Italy. ... Once on me, too, such fortune smiled.

In his speech Hannibal retraces the various phases of Scipio's career in detail and by a process of careful selection shapes Scipio's life and career into a virtual mirror image of his own. Hannibal, too, had been elected general of an army when still in his youth and had shown unflinching devotion to his family. He, too, had led victorious campaigns in Spain and recovered it from the enemy. Likewise, he had proceeded from Spain to his enemy's homeland, and, after numerous field victories, had come near to annihilating its power. As Hannibal rightly states at the opening of this portion of the speech, what Scipio is at Zama, Hannibal was at Trasimene and Cannae. On him, too, such fortunes once shone.

Placed at a significant point in the narrative (the end of the Decade and the end of the Second Punic War), Hannibal's speech is not only an elaboration of the theme of "the fickleness of fortune" in Polybian fashion. It also helps identify an important narrative thread in the Decade. Hannibal's account encourages readers to re-read and interpret as "parallel lives" the stories of the two generals' lives given in the previous books of the Decade.

The expression "parallel lives" is commonly associated with Plutarch's homonymous biographical work, in which the author compares the life of a Greek with the life of a Roman by pairing them and interpreting one "life" in light of the other. As Duff states (10), "each pair of *Parallel Lives* must be read as a complete book, not as individual biographies; no one Life can be understood without its partner." Plutarch's enterprise, however, was not a novelty in the Western tradition; rather, it marked the apex of a long tradition in the biographical genre.<sup>3</sup> More relevant for the present study is the fact that, prior

<sup>3</sup> Prior to Plutarch, the pairing of lives of historical figures enjoys its greatest popularity in the Latin literature of the first century B.C.E. and can be best interpreted as an ex-

to Plutarch, synkrisis is also an important means of moral characterization in the related genre of historiography. Thucydides in his *History* already displays an interest in setting up implicit comparisons between important historical characters.<sup>4</sup> Sallust, to move on to Latin historiography, openly contrasts Caesar and Cato as representatives of antithetical aspects of Roman *virtus*.<sup>5</sup> Livy, as is noted by many scholars, exploits synkrisis to spin narrative threads that inform the meaning of his history.

In her recent book *Livy's Written Rome*, Jaeger convincingly argues that Livy makes the stories of Manlius and Camillus complementary to one another. Manlius and Camillus match each other in their fight against the Gauls, Manlius defending the citadel from the inside, Camillus coming to its rescue from the outside. Afterwards, however, their lives diverge. Camillus becomes a second Romulus and the new founder of a city that encompasses the entire group of Romans, while Manlius becomes his rival and antithesis. By stirring up sedition and by separating the Capitol from the rest of the city, Manlius becomes the embodiment of a would-be *conditor alterius urbis*, the founder of a city represented by one place and one man only, the Capitol and Manlius.<sup>6</sup> Livy sets up a similar series of antitheses in his portraits of Aemilius Paullus and Perseus. Paullus is presented as the consummate figure of exemplary

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pression of the Romans' attempt to assert their equality with Greece. In *Brutus* 41–43 Cicero draws an important comparison between Themistocles and Coriolanus, and the dialogue is permeated by comparisons between Greeks and Romans. Nepos, his contemporary (and a near contemporary of Livy), is the author of an important work entitled *Chronica*, a universal history that can be read as an attempt to compare and synchronize Greek and Roman historic events. Greeks, however, were not the only target of comparison. Nepos' most famous work, *De viris illustribus*, extends the field of inquiry to other nations and juxtaposes a book of biographies of famous non-Romans with a book of Romans. There were at least 16 books and 400 lives were compared, with the foreigner in each category being treated before the Roman. The book of the non-Roman *duces* is rounded out by Hannibal's life. After this life Nepos turns to Roman generals, "so that it might be easier to judge which side produced the better by comparing the deeds of the foreigners with those of the Romans" (*Han.* 13.4 *quo facilius collatis utrorumque factis, qui viri praeferendi sint, possit iudicari*). Probably we will never know whether Scipio appeared in Nepos' list of famous Roman generals (very likely) and whether (or how) he was directly compared with Hannibal. Nepos' work (and Cicero's), however, reveals the Romans' fondness for biographical synkrisis as a tool to organize and define Roman history in its relation to other cultures. See Scardigli 20–21, with relevant bibliography.

<sup>4</sup> See Scardigli 4, with bibliography. Cf. also Duff 243–45.

<sup>5</sup> Sal. *Cat.* 53.6 *Sed memoria mea ingenti virtute, divorsis moribus fuere viri duo, M. Cato et C. Caesar*. I thank an anonymous referee for this reference.

<sup>6</sup> Jaeger 57–93.

knowledge, his rival Perseus as a foreigner who, unlike his Roman opponent, fails to learn from the past.<sup>7</sup>

This web of associations and antitheses between leading characters becomes even more complex and pronounced in the third Decade. As was suggested by Walsh, the three main Roman protagonists of this Decade, Fabius Cunctator, Marcellus, and Scipio Africanus, stand out “as complementary facets of the Roman genius for warfare and enlightened government.”<sup>8</sup> All three are also set against Hannibal.<sup>9</sup> This contrast is most explicit for the pair Hannibal and Scipio, the focus of the present study.

In his seminal study on the third Decade, Burck casts Livy’s Hannibal in the role of the antihero (33–34); for Burck, Livy sees only *insidiae*, *dolus*, and *fraus* in Hannibal’s conception of military operations, inhuman cruelty in their execution, mere satisfaction of vengeance and greed for booty in victory. This is exactly the opposite of Livy’s portrayal of Scipio, who is represented, according to Burck, as constantly showing self-confidence, respect for his duty, *clementia*, *comitas* to the vanquished, and *verecundia* towards women. Walsh, too, alludes to a synkrisis between the two characters and plays it out in terms similar to those adopted by Burck. He casts Livy’s Hannibal in the role of the tough, vigorous, deceitful, pitiless, and irreligious Carthaginian who puts his trust wholly in fortune and ultimately confesses that his trust has been wrongly based. Scipio, by contrast, is represented as the *fatalis dux* whose “piety to the gods and equity to men underlies all his attitudes.”<sup>10</sup> Thus Livy’s Scipio becomes the embodiment of Roman *virtus*, Hannibal, by contrast, the embodiment of foreign vices.

In this study I move beyond this familiar set of antitheses. Following the cue of Hannibal’s speech, I trace the web of correspondences between the life

<sup>7</sup> See Chaplin 118–19. Chaplin notes that Livy links Paullus and Perseus as a *documentum humanorum casuum* (45.40.6) and has Aemilius compare the misfortunes of the two men in his final *contio*.

<sup>8</sup> Walsh 1982: 1067. According to Walsh, Fabius, *cautior quam promptior*, epitomizes Roman conservative wisdom. Marcellus, is, in turn, the sword of Rome, whose *audacia* and savagery are juxtaposed with Fabius’ *prudentia* and *clementia*. Scipio represents the later offensive phase of the war and his policy is contrasted with the policy of containment advocated by Fabius. On this topic see my discussion below. For other examples of Livy’s characterization via comparison see Walsh 1961: 82–109 and Burck 31–36.

<sup>9</sup> For Fabius and Hannibal see Walsh 1961: 106. For Marcellus and Hannibal see Walsh 1982: 1067.

<sup>10</sup> Walsh 1982: 1068. For Livy’s representation of Hannibal see further Canter, Will, Cipriani, and Mader. See also Borzsák, who sees important parallels between Livy’s Hannibal and the Alexander of the historiographic tradition.

of Hannibal in the first half of the Decade and that of Scipio in the second half. I connect critical moments in their parallel lives and explore how the synkritic representation of the tales of Hannibal and Scipio does not simply exploit the exemplary opposition between a foreign enemy of Rome, bearer of foreign vices, and his Roman opponent. Rather, Livy's parallel lives of Scipio and Hannibal simultaneously reflect issues critical to the political discourse of the late Republic and set up an exemplary antithesis between the tales of Rome's past *virtus* and her present decline.

## 1. PASSAGE TO SPAIN

While still a boy, and at his father's bidding, Hannibal swears that he will be an enemy to the Romans (21.1.4). Soon after, summoned by Hasdrubal, he joins the Carthaginian general and his army in Spain—not without the stern opposition of Hanno and a few men, who included practically all the best men (21.4.1). At first, the memory of his father endears him to the army—the soldiers believe that the young Hamilcar has been restored to them—but soon his own merits win over soldiers and superiors alike (21.4.1–3). Hence, when Hasdrubal is killed, Hannibal is appointed his successor at the soldiers' urgent request, although he is still in his youth (21.3.1 *iuvenis*).<sup>11</sup> This, briefly put, is the information given by Livy about Hannibal's life and career prior to the war.

Next follows the detailed account of the first military operation of the war, Hannibal's siege of Saguntum. After a fierce resistance the city capitulates. Livy rounds out his description of its capture with a coda that records the painful deaths endured by some of its citizens: in order not to fall into the hands of the enemy some of them decide to throw themselves headlong into the fire together with their possessions, others shut themselves, their wives, and children into their houses and kill themselves by setting their homes ablaze (21.14.1, 4).

Where Livy compresses his account of Hannibal's early years into a few continuous passages, he gives Scipio's youth a much fuller, albeit more diffuse, treatment. Like Hannibal, Scipio shows military *virtus* and courage early on: with an act of valor he rescues his wounded father in the battle of Ticinus (21.46.7). Livy also reports an oath sworn by Scipio, right after the debacles of Trasimene and Cannae: when he learns that many of the nobles were saying that Rome was doomed and some were planning to escape overseas, Scipio, still a youth (*iuvenis*), solemnly swears never to desert the republic of the Roman people or to allow any other Roman citizen to do so (22.53.5–13).

<sup>11</sup> For Livy's portrait of Hannibal (21.4.2–9) see my discussion below.

Eventually, like Hannibal, he is elected commander in chief in spite of his youth and is shipped to the same province, Spain, where Hannibal had begun his military operations.<sup>12</sup> The successful capture of New Carthage marks the beginning of his campaign and, as in the case of Hannibal's capture of Saguntum, a coda rounds out Livy's description of the event (26.50): Scipio restores a captive woman unharmed to her parents and grants her an additional dowry to marry her betrothed, a leading man of the Celtiberians. This time, however, thanks to Scipio's exemplary show of *clementia* and *benignitas*, images of flames, death, and destruction are replaced by scenes of reconciliation, the promise of a wedding, and an important alliance between Romans and Celtiberians. History indeed worked wonders in creating parallels between the life of Hannibal and that of Scipio, but let us now examine how Livy uses these parallels to fashion meaning.

We begin by analyzing Scipio's first speech to his troops upon his arrival in Spain as general in 210. Placed in the first book of the second Pentad, Scipio's speech (26.41.3–25) explores (and exploits) themes that define the role he envisions for himself both as heir of his family and as member of the Roman State. In Livy's narrative Scipio is, above all, eager to present himself as the son of the man under whose command the troops previously served, seeking thereby to establish a privileged relationship between himself and his soldiers.

When Hannibal first joined his father's army in Spain, the old soldiers thought that the young Hamilcar had been restored to them, for they saw the same vigor in his look, the same fire in his eyes, the same expressions and features in his face.<sup>13</sup> What came naturally to Hamilcar's veterans is here expressly solicited by the newly appointed Roman general. Scipio underscores his physical resemblance to his father and uncle, and promises his soldiers that soon he will also reproduce an image of their mind, of their loyalty and courage, "so that each man shall say that his general Scipio has come back to life or has been born again."<sup>14</sup> He offers his soldiers a spectacle of *imagines* of the dead and casts himself as their living embodiment; through him the dead men continue to exist both in body and in soul. The speech creates a striking

<sup>12</sup> 26.19.9 *tunc civitas aetati haudquaquam maturae tantam rerum molem tantumque imperium permisit*. This appointment marks an important stage in Rome's constitutional development. Scipio, who had not been praetor or consul, was the first *privatus* to be invested with proconsular *imperium*. See Scullard 32.

<sup>13</sup> 21.4.2 *Hamilcarem iuvenem redditum sibi veteres milites credere; eundem vigorem in voltu vimque in oculis, habitum oris lineamentaue intueri*.

<sup>14</sup> 26.41.25 *Brevi faciam ut, quemadmodum nunc noscitis in me patris patruisque similitudinem oris voltusque et lineamenta corporis, ita ingenii fidei virtutisque effigiem vobis reddam ut revixisse aut renatum sibi quisque Scipionem imperatorem dicat*.

balance between themes of loss and new life. As Scipio himself reminds his soldiers, he is a new leaf, a new branch of an old family tree (26.41.22): "All I ask you, soldiers, is that you look with favor upon the name of the Scipios, upon the scion of your generals (*suboli imperatorum vestrorum*), growing again, as it were, from stems that have been cut down (*accisis recrescenti stirpibus*)."

This is not, however, the only role Scipio claims for himself. His mapping of Roman history, which culminates with a reminder of his family's accomplishment in the present war, reveals Scipio's interest in creating a connection between *familia* and state.

Scipio's excursus on Roman history begins with his recalling the many times Rome has been on the brink of disaster (26.41.9): "It is the lot assigned to us by some fate," Scipio says, "that in all the great wars we have emerged victorious from defeat." A list of *exempla* follows (26.41.10–12): Porsenna, the Gauls, the Samnites; the many fleets, generals, and armies defeated in the First Punic War; of more recent memory, the many battles lost in the Second Punic War: Trebia, Trasimene, Cannae; the revolt of Italy, Sardinia, and a great part of Sicily; and finally the threatening presence of Hannibal and his army almost at the gates of Rome.<sup>15</sup> In this general crash, one thing only was left standing intact and unshakable: the courage of the Roman people (26.41.12). Significantly, Scipio rounds out his excursus on Roman history by mentioning his father's achievements (26.41.13):

Under the command and auspices of my father, you were the first of all, soldiers, to oppose Hasdrubal when he, after the defeat at Cannae, was on his way to the Alps and Italy; and if he had joined his brother, the very name of the Roman people would be no more.

In Scipio's mapping out of the story of Rome, the feats of his family—the history of his *familia*—become an integral part of the history of the state: had it not been for his father and its army, the name of Rome would have been erased forever. We can go even further. In Scipio's speech, the behavior of Scipio's father and uncle (and that of their soldiers) parallels the paradigmatic behavior of the Roman state. As Scipio points out (26.41.12), thanks to its own *virtus* Rome survived great perils and the general crash (*In hac ruina rerum*) to which it was exposed during the Second Punic War; this alone stood intact and unshakable (*stetit una integra atque immobilis virtus populi Romani*). It was this *virtus* that raised and set up all the debris scattered to the ground

<sup>15</sup> The first three *exempla* are, however, introduced indirectly by the disclaimer *vetera omitto*.

(*haec omnia strata humi erexit ac sustulit*). Likewise, under the command and auspices of Scipio's father (26.41.13 *ductu auspicioque patris mei*), the army stood against (*obstitit*) Hasdrubal and saved Rome from complete obliteration (*nullum iam nomen esset populi Romani*). Together with his father and uncle, the soldiers were able to uphold the wavering fortune of the Roman people (26.41.17 *vos hic cum parentibus meis ... sustinuisse labantem fortunam populi Romani*).<sup>16</sup> In Scipio's speech, the behavior of the members of his family and their armies exemplifies therefore the *virtus* of the Roman people. From this perspective, Scipio's claim to be his father's scion moves beyond a narrow family dimension. By proclaiming that he will soon reproduce an image (26.41.25 *effigiem*) of his father's and uncle's mind, loyalty, and courage (26.41.25 *virtutis*), he is in fact proclaiming himself simultaneously heir to the *virtus* of the *patria*. For Scipio, family traditions and history are a reflection of the traditions and history of the State. His devotion to the *mores* of the *familia* is an expression of his loyalty to the *mores* of the *patria*. Thus, Scipio effectively reconciles affiliation to *patria* with affiliation to *familia* and underscores that to benefit the former is to promote the welfare of the latter. He reminds his army of veterans that their ability to defend the territory of Spain has simultaneously benefited him, in his capacity as member of the family of the Scipiones, and the nation as a whole (26.41.4–5):

Fortune laid me under obligation to you, before I could even see my province or camp ... because when possession of the province had been so disastrously lost, you by your courage (*virtute vestra*) held it intact both for the Roman people (*populo Romano*) and for me as their successor (*successori mihi*).<sup>17</sup>

*Patria* and *familia*, however, are not interchangeable entities; the latter is not the equivalent of the former but merely one of its parts. Hence, affiliation and loyalty to the one cannot fully replace affiliation to the other. Cicero enunciates this concept in *de Officiis* (1.57):

But when you have surveyed everything with a rational mind, there is no alliance (*societas*) more important and dearer than the one that links each one of us with our country. Parents are dear, children are dear, and so are relatives and friends; but the homeland by itself (*patria*) embraces all our affections; and what good citizen would hesitate to give his life for it, if he could benefit it by his death?<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> On this speech see also Jaeger 100 n. 16.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Scipio's speech to quell the mutiny of his troops in Spain. Similarly on that occasion Scipio establishes an equivalence between himself and the country: because of their mutiny the soldiers have banished the memory of their country and of himself (28.28.8 *Sed horum quoque memoriam, sicut patriae meique, eieceritis ex animis vestris*).

<sup>18</sup> See also Feldherr 116–23.



Scipio's famous oath after the defeat at Cannae provides the readers with a dramatic endorsement of the same idea: loyalty to the *familia* is subordinate to that to the *patria*. Scipio is willing to sacrifice family and family possessions should his oath of loyalty to the state be proven false (22.53.10–11):

“I swear from my heart,” he says, “that I myself will not desert the republic of the Roman people, or permit any other Roman citizen to desert it; if I knowingly speak false, may you Jupiter Optimus Maximus bring me, my house, my family, and my estate to a shameful ruin.”

A clear and coherent portrait of the young Scipio begins to emerge. Livy's Scipio, as presented in the early phases of his career and upon his arrival in Spain, is the Roman *civis* who correctly defines the norms of the complex relationship between *patria* and *familia*, public and private, individual and collectivity.<sup>19</sup>

Hannibal's early career is marked by an opposite political ideology, as is powerfully foreshadowed by the solemn oath that first introduces the reader to his character. Hannibal's oath, contrary to Scipio's, takes place in a private setting. It seals a compact between a child and his father; at his father's bidding the son swears on the altar of the gods to carry on, from one generation to the next, the hatred of his family towards the Romans (21.1.4). Hannibal's line of conduct will be forever limited and controlled by the nature of his pledge. In Livy's narrative, it is, above all, Hannibal's close identification with his family that drives his campaign against the Romans (21.5.1–2):

For the rest, from the day he was proclaimed commander in chief, as though Italy had been assigned to him as his province and he had been instructed to wage war on Rome, he decided to attack Saguntum. He thought that no postponement was permissible lest he, too, like his father Hamilcar, and afterwards Hasdrubal, should be overtaken by some accident while delaying.

Often dismissed as a rather unsatisfying explanation of the causes of the Second Punic War,<sup>20</sup> this passage gains poignant relevance in light of Hannibal's

<sup>19</sup> Cf. 28.28.11–13, where Scipio praises the ability of the state to survive the loss of individuals, however great.

<sup>20</sup> See, for example, Burck, esp. 29–30: “There is little trace of these reasons given by Fabius Pictor and Polybius in Livy ... Instead, he ascribes the entire responsibility for the war to Hannibal and the majority of the Carthaginian Senate. Hannibal's hatred, his desire for power and his craving for military glory urge him from one undertaking to another, but always, from the moment of assuming his command, keeping his sights set on the war against Rome in Italy.” For modern criticisms of Livy's analysis of the causes of the Second Punic War see further Jal xxxv– xlv.

oath, for it effectively reflects Hannibal's conceptualization of the war against Rome as an additional chapter of the on-going private struggle between his family and the Romans. In waging war against the Romans, Hannibal carries on his family tradition and fulfills his oath. He carries out what his father and brother-in-law had long striven for but failed to accomplish.

Respectively placed at the beginning of the first and second Pentads, Scipio's and Hannibal's journeys to Spain define a turning point in Livy's narrative of each general's life. Hannibal's arrival in Spain and his subsequent capture of Saguntum not only mark the obvious beginning of the hostilities between Rome and Carthage but, as in the case of Scipio, are also the events in which the general actively recognizes his role as heir to his family legacy and commits to his inheritance. But Hannibal's behavior reveals a fatal flaw. Unlike Scipio, Hannibal is unable to reconcile his affiliation to the legacy of the family and his affiliation to his *patria*. He privileges the interests of his *familia* over those of the state. In crossing into Spain and beginning the war against Rome, Hannibal misreads or rather willfully ignores the instructions of his own *patria*. He operates "*as though (velut)* Italy had been assigned to him as his province and he had been instructed to wage war on Rome." This line of conduct will have dire consequences for himself and his expedition. But it does not end here. As Hanno anticipates (in a set of speeches that are most probably Livian "fabrications"<sup>21</sup>), Hannibal's subversion of loyalties results in a serious threat to the existence of Carthage itself.

Hanno's first speech (the first of the Decade) takes place when Hannibal is about to join Hamilcar's army in Spain.<sup>22</sup> Opposing popular sentiment, Hanno cautions the Carthaginians about letting the young Hannibal join the army of his father (21.3.5): "Do we fear that ... the son of the king whose son-in-law was made heir to the command of our armies may find us too slow in accepting him for our master?" Rather, Hannibal should be kept at home and be taught to live in submission to the laws (*sub legibus*) and the magistrates (*sub magistratibus*), on equal footing (*aequo iure*) with others, in order to prevent him from harming the country in the future, or as Hanno has it, "lest this small fire one day kindle a great conflagration" (21.3.6 *ne quandoque parvus hic ignis incendium ingens exsuscitet*). Hanno's warning is given to no avail. Hannibal is allowed to join the army and does not learn to submit to the laws of the state. When the Roman ambassadors arrive at Carthage after

<sup>21</sup> See Lenschau and Clauss 174 n. 19.

<sup>22</sup> In Livy, Hanno's first speech is reported when Hannibal's election to general is about to be ratified by the Carthaginians, but it refers to a previous event when Hannibal, still a youth, was allowed to join Hamilcar's army.

Hannibal has already crossed to Spain and besieged Saguntum, it is too late. Hanno, who, as is noted by Mader (209–16), is here cast in the role of the Herodotean wise adviser, alerts the Carthaginians that Hannibal has become an internal enemy besieging the state.<sup>23</sup> The Carthaginians have nourished the fire now engulfing Carthage itself (21.10.4 *Aluistis ergo hoc incendium quo nunc ardetis*).

In a recent book Feldherr has shown how Livy's history is, among other things, a gallery of *exempla* that (120) "not only teach the subordination of the smaller unit in the interests of the larger state but also reinforce both the interdependency and the parallelism between family, state, and body." Cincinnatus leaves his farm to become *dictator*, Brutus puts his sons to death for treason, Mucius Scaevola burns off his hand in what is a demonstration of Roman citizenship. In the third Decade Livy develops this theme by shaping the characters of Hannibal and Scipio as representatives of two antithetical conceptions of the relation between individual and State. Scipio is shown as following the exemplary behavior of Cincinnatus, Brutus, and Mucius Scaevola. Hannibal is his negative complement. He embodies the menace that threatens the very existence of the life of a state when such a relationship is subverted—he is the internal fire that, as Hanno states, threatens to destroy the collectivity.

## 2. GENERALSHIP PUT TO THE TEST

In 216, after his legendary crossing of the Alps and an uninterrupted string of victories at Ticinus (218), Trebia (218), Trasimene (217), and Cannae (216), Hannibal sets his winter quarters in Capua, the city that had deserted the Romans to side with the Carthaginians. Drawing on previous accounts and on an ethnographical tradition that connected a people's character with that of the land they inhabit, Livy gives readers a brief but significant description of the city. As Livy puts it, the city was almost genetically inclined to luxury (23.4.4 *Prona semper civitas in luxuriam*), a result not only of defects of character but also of the abundant opportunity for indulgences and the beguilement of all the charms, the *amoenitas*, of land and sea.<sup>24</sup> The story that fol-

<sup>23</sup> 21.10.10 *Carthagini nunc Hannibal vineas turresque admovet: Carthaginis moenia quatit ariete*. For an analysis of Hanno's speeches see further Paratore 40–66 and Clauss 174–77, with relevant bibliography.

<sup>24</sup> Livy returns to this topic at 27.3.2, where he reports that Fulvius Flaccus removed the Roman army from the city fearing that its great charms might weaken his army, as they had Hannibal's. Cf. also 7.38.5–8; I owe this last reference to a referee. For a similar description of Capua see Plb. 7.1, who, however, attributes Capua's luxury mainly to its wealth. More generally, on the *topos* that connects a physically benign environment to *luxus* and *malum otium* see Thomas 126.

lows is well known. The Carthaginian army, seduced by the *luxuria* of Capua, undergoes a dangerous metamorphosis. Once inside the city, the undefeated Carthaginians are no longer what they were. The Carthaginian army, never conquered by hardships, falls victim to the excesses of comfort (23.18.11 *Itaque, quos nulla mali vicerat vis, perdidere nimia bona ac voluptates immodicae*). Sleep, wine, rich dinners, prostitutes, bathing, and idleness so weaken the bodies and spirits of the Carthaginian soldiers that it is their past victories rather than their present strength that thereafter protects them (23.18.12); the Carthaginian army becomes a shadow of its former self.<sup>25</sup> Livy concludes his account of this sudden metamorphosis with a somber remark underscoring Hannibal's responsibility: "and so, by Hercules, it was as if he (sc. Hannibal) was setting out from Capua with a different army, for he had preserved nothing at all of the old discipline" (23.18.14 *Itaque hercule, velut si cum alio exercitu a Capua exiret, nihil usquam pristinae disciplinae tenuit*).<sup>26</sup>

Livy's strategy for presenting the episode may be evaluated in terms of its *topos*-like quality. Livy himself exploits the same theme in the opening chapter of Book 39, creating a juxtaposition between the Roman military campaigns against the Ligurians on the one hand and Vulso's campaign in Asia on the other.<sup>27</sup> The former had the effect of making the troops keener to show their valor (39.1.2); the military campaign in Asia had the opposite effect: as a result of the attractive nature of its cities, the abundant provisions from land and sea, the effeminacy of its people, and its royal wealth, Asia was making Roman armies richer rather than more courageous (39.1.3 *ditiores quam fortiores exercitus faciebat*). Hence the introduction of the first seeds of *luxuria* into the *Urbs* (39.6.7–9). But there is another important aspect to the story.

<sup>25</sup> For a similar account see D.S. 26.11 and App. *Hann.* 43. The latter, however, speaks solely of Hannibal's behavior: "This fierce warrior gave himself up to unaccustomed luxury and the delights of love."

<sup>26</sup> On this passage see Weissenborn and Müller ad loc. Cf. also 23.45.6, where Livy's Hannibal openly acknowledges the fact that he led one army into winter quarters at Capua and a different one out of them (*militem alium profecto se in hiberna Capuam duxisse, alium inde eduxisse*). The idea is reiterated by Marcellus, who declares that Capua had been Hannibal's Cannae (23.45.4). See further 23.18.13, where Livy states that among the military experts Hannibal's delay at Capua was seen as a more serious mistake than not having led the Carthaginian army immediately to the city of Rome after the victory at Cannae. That delay could be regarded as having merely delayed the victory, this mistake as having taken away from him the power to win.

<sup>27</sup> For a discussion on the passage see Walsh 1994 ad loc. For a full treatment of the idea of *luxuria* in Livy as a corrupting element that contributed to Rome's decline see Luce 250–64. For Livy's predating of the introduction of *luxuria* in Rome with respect to Sallust see note below and later discussion.

As he had done with Hannibal, Livy connects Vulso's inability to preserve the old discipline with his army's changed behavior. In fact this time he does so even more prominently. In 39.6.5 Livy reports that one of the reasons Vulso delayed his triumph was that he was rumored to have undermined by all manner of laxity the military discipline that his predecessor L. Scipio had strictly preserved (cf. also 39.1.4). Livy further adds (39.6.6–7) that Vulso's reputation was sullied not only by unfavorable reports of what was said to have happened in the province but also from what could be seen every day amongst his soldiers (*in militibus eius*), for foreign luxury had been brought to the city by the army that had been in Asia.

Livy's predecessor Sallust uses a similar *topos* to explain Roman decadence.<sup>28</sup> For Sallust, however, the army is that of Sulla, and the year is 83 B.C.E. For him, too, the fierce army of men is seduced by the amenities of the land (Asia again) and returns home an army of women (*Cat.* 11.5 *Loca amoena, voluptaria facile in otio ferocis militum animos molliverant*).<sup>29</sup> And in his account, too, the Roman army's falling victim to the *luxuria* of the East is explicitly connected with failed leadership: to secure the loyalty of the army he leads into Asia, Sulla allows it a luxurious style of living and an excessive license foreign to the manners of the Roman forefathers (*Cat.* 11.5 *exercitum ... contra morem maiorum luxuriose nimisque liberaliter habuerat*). The metamorphosis that transforms Hannibal's soldiers into an army of effeminates during their stay at Capua foreshadows the destiny endured at a later time by a Roman army and eventually by Rome itself. I will return to this aspect later, but for now it suffices to say that the *topos* that presents the sturdy victor as seduced by the *amoenitas* of a foreign country is also constructed as a powerful *exemplum* of unsuccessful leadership, as is shown by the episodes so far analyzed. As the accounts of Livy and Sallust suggest, the army's falling victim to the allurements of *luxuria* is also closely connected with the general's failure to enforce and preserve the former discipline. But in Livy's narrative of the Second Punic War Hannibal's generalship is not the only one put to the test.

After having completed a successful campaign in Spain, Scipio returns to New Carthage, fulfills his vows to the gods, celebrates gladiatorial games in

<sup>28</sup> On the relation between Sallust's account and Livy's see Earl 45–46. Earl notices the similarities between the two accounts both in their descriptions of the lax discipline of the armies and in listing articles of luxury. He then explains Sallust's postdating of the various stages of moral decline as an effort on Sallust's part to be consistent, since his over-concentration on *concordia* has led him to reject the tradition of the growth of *luxuria* in the earlier second century. See further below.

<sup>29</sup> See also Ramsey ad loc.

honor of his father and uncle, and, after quelling a mutiny, returns to Rome in 206 where he easily wins the consulship (28.21–38). The following year he moves into his province, Sicily, to prepare his next move in the war against Hannibal: the crossing to Africa.<sup>30</sup> While in Sicily, Scipio and his army meet a challenge similar to the one Hannibal and his army faced during their winter in Capua, at least according to the charges leveled against Scipio by some members of the Senate. Once in Syracuse—the largest of Greek cities and the loveliest of all cities (Cic. *Ver.* 4.117)—Scipio seems to allow his troops to fall victim to the charms of the city and to forget the war against Carthage and Hannibal, indeed his entire army is corrupted by *licentia* (29.19.12–13 *mol-liter cohortem totam Syracusarum amoenitate frui; Carthaginem atque Hannibalem excidisse de memoria; exercitum omnem licentia corruptum*). His situation is even worse than Hannibal's, for Scipio himself seems to have been seduced by the charms of Syracuse and to have lost his Roman identity. His enemies denounce his un-Roman and un-military style of living (29.19.11 *ipsius etiam imperatoris non Romanus modo sed ne militaris quidem cultus iactabatur*). They describe him strolling about in the gymnasium dressed in a Greek mantle and sandals and giving his attention to Greek books and physical exercise (29.19.12). Like Capua for Hannibal in the first Pentad of the Decade, Syracuse is an important testing ground for Scipio's leadership in the second; the *amoenitas* of Syracuse exercises its seductive power and threatens to transform Scipio's army (and Scipio himself) and to alter its military and Roman identity.<sup>31</sup>

Once again, however, Scipio shows the distance that separates him from the Carthaginian general. In proper Roman fashion, Livy's Scipio does not prepare a verbal reply in his own defense but, instead, tangible evidence (29.22.1 *Scipio res, non verba ad purgandum sese paravit*).<sup>32</sup> The *legati* sent from Rome to assess the truthfulness of the charges of indolence in the general and lack of discipline in the army are met with an extraordinary spectacle of efficiency. As Livy reports, they are so impressed by what they see that they leave Syracuse fully believing that the Carthaginian people can be defeated by that

<sup>30</sup> On the debate between Fabius Maximus Cunctator and Scipio Africanus over whether Africa should be allotted as one of the provinces for the year see 28.40.1–45.9 and my discussion below. On Scipio's return from Spain see further Scullard 108–15.

<sup>31</sup> On the episode cf. D.S. 27.4.1–7, which mentions a commission sent to Scipio to investigate whether Pleminius had pillaged the temple of Persephone at Locri with the approval of Scipio, but is silent on the charges of *luxuria* against Scipio. The story is narrated only by later authors (Cf. Plut. *Cat. Ma.* 3.5–8; Tac. *Ann.* 2.59.1).

<sup>32</sup> For the association of *res* with the Romans and *verba* with the Greeks see Sal. *Cat.* 8.4–5.

general and that army and by no other (29.22.4); thus they bid him to cross to Africa (29.22.6): "Such was their joy when they left, that it was as if they were to carry to Rome the news of a victory, not of a magnificent preparation for war."

At Capua, the victorious march of the Carthaginian army changes course under Hannibal's failed leadership and turns into a process of self-alienation and of estrangement from its former self. By contrast, at Syracuse Scipio shows his ability to preserve *disciplina*; as a result, his army emerges unscathed from the danger of becoming de-Romanized. And Scipio not only protects the "Roman" identity of his army but also shows a willingness and ability to "make Roman" what is foreign. His victorious march from Italy to Africa turns into a process of Romanization to which he subjects his Roman allies.

The tale of Masinissa shows Scipio's strategy in action. Loyal friend of the Romans and Scipio's faithful ally, Masinissa's wedding with Sophonisba reveals a weakness typical of a race inclined to succumb to seduction (30.12.18 *ut est genus Numidarum in venerem praeceps*). When Masinissa finally renounces his passion and thus overcomes the weakness of his own race (he allows Sophonisba to kill herself), Scipio (and later the Senate) showers him with important gifts that mark Masinissa's transformation into a Roman: Masinissa is given a golden wreath, a golden bowl, a curule chair, the ivory staff, the embroidered toga, and the tunic adorned with palms—the attire with which the Roman generals celebrate their triumph, the highest distinction granted to a Roman, as Scipio reminds Masinissa (30.15.11–12).<sup>33</sup> By his action, Scipio successfully transforms Masinissa's loyalty to himself into an affiliation to Rome. Scipio symbolically admits Masinissa into the Roman State and, by the same token, implicitly compels Masinissa to acknowledge his new position (and responsibility) as a member of that State. Thus, Scipio successfully converts military alliance into an active process of Romanization, a process that increases the strength of the State he represents.

Let us briefly return to Zama. Significantly placed at the end of the Decade, the final battle between Carthaginians and Romans closes Livy's analysis of the parallel lives of Scipio and Hannibal and powerfully reflects the antithetical *itinera* undertaken by the two generals.

Livy's representation of the Roman army at Zama illustrates Scipio's ability to preserve the Roman identity of his army. After an initial skirmish in

<sup>33</sup> See Butler and Scullard ad loc. Cf. also the gifts sent by the Senate, which, as Livy reminds us, were customarily furnished to a consul (30.17.13 *militaremque suppellectilem qualem praeberi consuli mos esset*). On the story of Sophonisba see further Scullard 133–34. Diodorus (27.7–8) and Appian (*Pun.* 28) report the story but remain silent about the gifts awarded to Masinissa.



which the Carthaginian cavalry is momentarily put to flight by the conjoined efforts of the Italian and Numidian cavalry, the pitched battle begins. Scipio's army charges against the enemy with one voice, louder and more terrifying for its unanimous sound (30.34.1 *congruens clamor ab Romanis eoque maior et terribilior*); the Roman army is compact and presses against the enemy with its own weight and that of its arms (30.34.2 *pugna Romana stabilis et suo et armorum pondere incumbendum in hostem*); it is a virtually indivisible body that has retained its specific Roman identity.

The spectacle offered by the Carthaginian army is strikingly different and clearly reveals the consequences of Hannibal's failure to establish a reciprocity between himself and Carthage. Hannibal's hierarchical vision of power, which prioritizes the individual over the State, prevents him from acknowledging the intrinsic weakness of an army lacking unity of interest and purpose. We saw earlier that, unlike Scipio, Hannibal, in his role as general, operates primarily as scion of his *familia* rather than as a member of his *patria*. Consequently, he fails to organize the heterogeneous members of his army into a unified whole that identifies itself with the State and is therefore loyal to it, as Livy's description of his army at Zama underscores.

Unlike Polybius, Livy describes Hannibal's army as having no language, no custom, no law, no arms, no clothing, and no general appearance in common, nor the same reason for serving (30.33.8). As the two infantries meet, the first line of Hannibal's army charges with discordant voices, coming as they do from a mixed assortment of peoples with a variety of mother-tongues (30.34.1 *dissonae illis, ut gentium multarum discrepantibus linguis, voces*); they are easily dislodged by the first attack of the Romans (30.34.3).<sup>34</sup> At the battle of the Ticinus, the first serious battle against the Romans, the victorious Carthaginian army demanded to fight with one accord and one voice (21.45.9 *proelium uno animo et voce una poscunt*). Afterwards, however, Hannibal's army begins a process of decline at Capua with Hannibal's failure to preserve *disciplina* and

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Plb. 15.11.1–2, who simply mentions the different origins of the twelve thousand mercenaries who composed the first line. Admittedly, he too reports the strange confusion of shouts raised by the mercenaries and quotes *Il.* 4.437 as a comment on their variety (15.12.9). But he adds (15.13.1) that the mercenaries were successful and at first prevailed because of their daring and skill and wounded many of the Romans; it was only later that they were forced to retreat because of the superiority of Roman weapons (15.13.2–3). We may further notice that Plb. 15.11.2–12 reports that Hannibal's third line was formed by the veterans he had brought over from Italy and that Hannibal could fully rely on their loyalty. Livy, however, as suits his presentation of Hannibal's army as heterogeneous and of doubtful loyalty, states that Hannibal had separated the third line, formed by Italians, because it was uncertain whether they were allies or enemies (30.35.9).



to protect his men from *luxuria*; the process culminates at Zama with Hannibal's inability to transform military partnership into cultural and political affiliation either to Carthage or to himself, as representative of the State. His army at Zama, like the Oriental armies of Xerxes and Darius, is characterized by *polyglottia* and lack of cohesive national harmony and identity. These are the flaws that in Livy's narrative eventually account for its ultimate defeat.<sup>35</sup>

### 3. ROMAN HANNIBALS

Thus ends the story of the Second Punic War. In an editorial comment after the battle of Cannae, Polybius explicitly connects Rome's ability to turn the tide of war to its constitutional system (3.118.8–9):

Although the Romans were now unquestionably beaten and their military reputation was shattered, thanks to the peculiar virtues of their constitution and wise counsel they not only recovered their supremacy in Italy and afterwards defeated the Carthaginians but in a few years became masters of the entire world.”<sup>36</sup>

To support this claim, later in his work, he embarks on a book-length excursus analyzing the Roman constitution in comparison to that of other famous nations, Carthage included (Book 6). Livy follows a different path. He never openly discusses the reasons for Carthaginian defeat and Roman victory—hence the charges of political shortsightedness leveled against him.<sup>37</sup> And yet the reasons are there for the reader to see. By creating a network of correspon-

<sup>35</sup> For a similar representation of Xerxes' and Darius' army with an emphasis on their majestic proportions and heterogeneity see respectively Hdt. 7.61–100 and Arr. *An.* 2.8.5–8. For Homer's description of Trojan *polyglottia* see *Il.* 4.433–38. Note that the armies of Xerxes and Darius are also described in the historiographical tradition as prone to *luxuria*. For *luxuria* and Xerxes' army cf. Hdt. 9.80–82; for Darius' army see D.S. 17.35.1–4, Curt. 3.11.20, Plut. *Alex.* 20.6–8. For other points of contact between Hannibal and Xerxes see Mader 218.

<sup>36</sup> On this passage see Walbank ad loc.

<sup>37</sup> See, for example, Walsh 1982: 1060, “As the modern critic reviews his (i.e., Livy's) accounts of the main theatres of fighting in Italy, Spain, Greece, Sicily and Africa, the complaints are continual and mostly justified. The strategy of commanders, the troop movements, the battle-tactics, the topographical indications, the numbers of soldiers engaged or fallen are all too frequently inaccurately or misleadingly presented, and the availability of the version of Polybius for much of the war underlines Livy's weaknesses. It is true that our historian frequently provides precious additional information not recorded by Polybius; but a steady comparison of the two histories in any extended section leaves no doubt where the greater accuracy and intelligibility lies.”

dences between the lives of Hannibal and Scipio (and therefore between the two Pentads), Livy allows the reader to find the reasons by following the narrative thread of the generals' "parallel lives." Events that Livy's critics have all too often labeled as inaccurate, loosely connected to one another, and not organized in the all-too-efficient and scientific model of "cause and effect," are instead coherent pieces of a sophisticated architectural design whose effect depends on the reader's ability to join them together in a meaningful way.<sup>38</sup>

Confronted with similar challenges, Hannibal fails where Scipio does not; this eventually leads to defeat and victory respectively. However, Livy's representation of Hannibal does more than provide the causes of the Carthaginian general's defeat in the Second Punic War; it also works as an important *exemplum* for Livy's contemporary Roman audience.

Scholars have long acknowledged that Livy's portrait of Hannibal at the opening of the Decade (21.4.2–9) is modeled on Sallust's description of Catiline (*Cat.* 5.3–5).<sup>39</sup> More recently, Clauss (169–82) has shown that the parallels between Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae* and the opening of Livy's Book 21 extend beyond this portrayal.<sup>40</sup> In particular, Hanno's representation of Hannibal and the accusation he levels against him mirror closely the charge of *cupido regni* leveled against Catiline by Sallust. For Clauss the assimilation of Hannibal to Catiline has an important narrative function, inviting the reader to establish a connection between Hannibal/Carthage and Catiline/Rome.<sup>41</sup> We may carry Clauss' conclusions a bit further. The Sallustean subtext, so manifestly displayed at the beginning of the Decade, invites the reader to read the tale of Hannibal's deeds throughout the Decade within a specific Sallustean framework. Hannibal's initial *ambitio* (and *imperi cupido*) compels him to subvert the norms of the complex relationship between public

<sup>38</sup> Significant work has been done on the structure of Livy's first Decade and on the recurrent themes and *topoi* that shape its narrative structure. See, for example, Kraus, Miles, Jaeger, and Feldherr. Livy's third Decade, however, has long been neglected by Livy scholars and generally viewed as a mediocre adaptation of Polybius' account of the Second Punic War. For new and different critical assessments see now Jaeger and Chaplin.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Walsh 1985 ad loc. and 1982: 1067. Cf. also Ramsey ad 5.3–5.

<sup>40</sup> See also Paratore 42–62.

<sup>41</sup> Clauss 180: "Moreover, Livy's moral agenda might well have motivated him to describe the opening of the Hannibalic war in terms reminiscent of the Catilinarian conspiracy. By evoking in his presentation of Carthaginian politics the bitter hatred and internecine infighting that prompted Catiline's failed *coup d'état*, Livy facilitates a telling comparison between the two city-states, one which suggests that the very elements that led to the destruction of Carthage—*odium* and *cupido regni*—could lead Rome along a similar path. Such behavior is surely an example to avoid."

and private; this and his subsequent Sulla-like laxity at Capua retrace important moments of Rome's decline as outlined by Sallust (*Cat.* 10–11).<sup>42</sup> The synkritic representation of the tales of Hannibal and Scipio, therefore, does not simply fashion an exemplary antithesis between a foreign enemy of Rome, the bearer of foreign vices, and his Roman opponent. More exactly, the parallel lives of Scipio and Hannibal juxtapose two distinct moments of Roman history. The tale of Hannibal's deeds and Scipio's contrasts starkly the story of Rome's past *virtus* with the history of Rome's present decline as outlined in Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae*.<sup>43</sup>

When did this decline begin? Notoriously Sallust dated the beginning of Roman decline to the destruction of Carthage in 146. With no enemies left to oppose its authority, Rome began to show signs of moral failure and to turn its own strength against itself (*Cat.* 10.1–3).<sup>44</sup> Livy is not so explicit, but a passage in the third Decade suggests that he, too, might have viewed the struggle with Carthage as an important climax of Roman history. At the end of the Decade, Hannibal addresses his own citizens in a provocative speech analyzing the causes of the Carthaginian defeat (30.44.7–8):

<sup>42</sup> For Hannibal and *avaritia*, the other important vice that, according to Sallust, contributes to Rome's moral decline, see Liv. 26.38.3, where Hannibal is described as *praeceps in avaritiam*. For Sallust's view of the course of Roman history see Earl 14–15: "After the foundation of the city, in which a diverse and wandering mob was made into a *civitas* by the action of *concordia*, Rome first enjoyed the government of kings, who, however, eventually fell prey to *superbia dominatioque*. The kings were then expelled and the Republic, with its system of annual magistracies, established. Then followed a long period of *boni mores* and *concordia maxuma* when *virtus* reigned supreme and which was ended only when Carthage, *aemula imperi Romani*, was destroyed. Then arose *ambitio* and *avaritia* until, with the domination of Sulla, *luxuria* gave a final impetus to Rome's career to utter ruin, moral, social and political." On the meaning of *ambitio* and its relation to *virtus* see Earl 112–14. Earl rightly argues that *virtus* is to be understood as the pursuit of preeminent *gloria* in the service of the *res publica*; *ambitio*, by contrast, is the pursuit of *gloria* at the expense of the *res publica*.

<sup>43</sup> Notably, in Polybius, Carthage's process of decline already implicitly foreshadows the process of decline that one day will affect Rome (6.51.1): "It seems to me that the constitution of Carthage was originally well contrived as regards its most distinctive points. There were kings, the house of Elders was an aristocratic force, the people were supreme in matters proper to them, and the entire organization of the state resembled very much that of Rome and Sparta. But at the time when they entered on the Hannibalic War, the Carthaginian constitution had degenerated, and that of Rome was superior."

<sup>44</sup> For a similar idea cf. Jug. 41.2–5. Earl 47 suggests a Poseidonian source for Sallust's theory of *metus hostilis*. However, the idea was common in ancient political thought; it appears in Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius.

The time to weep was when our arms were taken from us, our ships were burned, and foreign wars forbidden; that wound was deadly for us. And you have no reason to believe that the Romans had any regard for your domestic peace; no great country can live in peace for long. If it lacks an enemy abroad it finds one at home, just as powerful bodies appear protected against external infection but are weighed down by their very strength.

By openly echoing Sallust's views on the reasons for Rome's moral and political decline, Hannibal's speech is not only a somber reflection on Carthaginian defeat. The speech of Hannibal, who has now been cast in the role of the wise adviser, may also suggest the destiny that awaits Rome once the city has defeated Hannibal, its last enemy and the last serious threat to Rome's world supremacy.<sup>45</sup> For Livy, however, the decline did not begin in the year 146. The overt allusion to Sallust in Hannibal's speech suggests that, for Livy, this process of decline began at an earlier stage of Roman history, namely with the defeat of Hannibal at the end of the Second Punic War. As we noted earlier, Livy also predates the introduction of *luxuria* in Rome, to 187 B.C.E.<sup>46</sup> After the defeat of Hannibal, Rome undergoes a change and, tellingly, Scipio himself, the glorious winner of the battle of Zama, is the first victim of this dangerous process of metamorphosis in Livy's narrative.

The first signs of such a change are already visible in the last phases of the Second Punic War, during the famous debate between Scipio, who urges the Senate to allot him Africa as a province, and Fabius Cunctator, who fiercely opposes the request (28.40–44).<sup>47</sup> The confrontation between Scipio and Fabius best dramatizes the moment of change in Roman policy from defensive to offensive war, the former aptly advocated by the old Fabius, the latter by the young Scipio.<sup>48</sup> The debate is a defining moment of Scipio's career in still another respect. Scipio's initial determination to go to the people if the Senate does not accede to his wishes underscores Scipio's potential for subverting the norms that regulate the correct relationship between the *unus* and the state (28.40.1–2, esp. *acturum se id per populum aperte ... si senatus adversaretur*; cf. also 28.45.1). On this occasion Scipio eventually yields to the laws of the State. He permits the Senate to allot the provinces; in so doing, he

<sup>45</sup> On this topic see further Will 169.

<sup>46</sup> See 39.6 and my discussion above.

<sup>47</sup> On this episode see Chaplin 93–97, with relevant bibliography. On Livy's Thucydidean model see Rodgers. For a historical analysis of the events see Scullard 168–69.

<sup>48</sup> For the significance of the difference in age between Fabius and Scipio see Neraudau 359–61.

reasserts the code of behavior that marked his actions in the early stages of his career (28.45.8). From this moment on, however, a Hannibal-like insubordination becomes a defining trait of Scipio's character.

The two versions of Scipio's trial that mark the exit of Africanus from Livy's history underscore his newly ambivalent relationship to the Roman State. The first version of the trial ends with Scipio's initiating a triumphal procession through the entire city (*per totam urbem*) followed by the entire assembly (*universa contio*) on the anniversary of the battle of Zama (38.51.12–13).<sup>49</sup> As is noted by Jaeger (150–51), the procession unites the general to his fellow citizens and establishes an impression of a state of equilibrium and reciprocity between Scipio and his fellow citizens. After the procession, as he realizes that his career is over, Scipio departs from Rome, retires to Liternum and never returns to the city. The second version is far more dramatic. It shows Africanus valuing family connections over the rules of civic life and highlights the distance between Scipio's former relation to the state and his present one. As Livy reports (38.56.9), Scipio abandons his post as legate in Etruria (*relicta legatione*), rushes into the Roman Forum, pushes the bailiff from his brother and, when the tribunes try to hold him back, assaults them, with more thought for family loyalty than his role as citizen (*magis pie quam civiliter*). In the words of Livy's Gracchus (38.56.11–13), with this defiant action, Scipio has fallen short of his own standards of civil behavior, which included reprimanding the people for wishing to appoint him perpetual consul and dictator and refusing to allow statues of himself to be erected in public places.

The two versions of the trial, therefore, underscore the ambivalent legacy of Scipio Africanus.<sup>50</sup> Livy's narrative of Scipio's career does not end with a straightforward eulogy of his *res gestae*. Livy takes leave from the great hero of the Second Punic War on a more ambiguous note. Celebration of Scipio's *res gestae* comes with a forewarning of the challenges that Rome will face. Livy's final farewell to Scipio—so puzzlingly ambivalent—acknowledges that the victory over Hannibal has come with a price for Scipio and for Rome itself.<sup>51</sup> At the end of his life, Scipio, the man who defeated Hannibal thanks to his

<sup>49</sup> Cf. also Scipio's speech preceding the procession (38.51.7–11).

<sup>50</sup> On this topic and for a recent treatment of Scipio's trial see Jaeger 132–37 with bibliography.

<sup>51</sup> As is noted by Chaplin (97 n. 56), the similarities between Scipio and the dynasts of the first century include the following: 1) the danger of *libertas* if one man is above the law; 2) the allegation that Scipio behaved as if he were a dictator; 3) his greater aptitude for war than for peace; 4) tearing up the account books and requesting the keys to the treasury; 5) the use of tribunician power to override constitutional procedure. On the trial of Scipio see further Earl 114 and Scullard 216–24.

Roman *virtus*, shows problematic signs of Hannibal-like behavior, and his exit from Livy's narrative foreshadows the beginning of that process of metamorphosis whereby the old Roman Scipiones will give way, little by little, to Roman Hannibals.<sup>52</sup>

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